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CAUSAL AND GEOMETRIC RELATIONS* 
Douglas W. Shrader, Jr. 
Is space curved? The discovery of Non-Euclidean 
geometries inspired several attempts to determine 
empirically the topology of physical space. Hans 
Reichenbach recognized that a number of causal principles 
are presupposed in these experiments and suggested that, 
for geometry to be an empirical matter, we have to intro-
duce the requirement that no causal relations are vio-
lated (that there are no causal anomalies). Though 
objectionable in certain respects, I think Reichenbach's 
thesis represents a significant insight into the inter-
dependence of geometry and causation. The geometry we 
ascribe to physical space will help determine the nature 
of our causal laws, and vice-versa. But close as the 
connections between geometry and causation might be, 
they do not guarantee a unique prescription—even in 
conjunction with unlimited experience, a system of 
causal laws may not suffice to pick out a unique geo-
metry, or vice-versa. 
1. Introduction. Euclid developed his system of planar 
geometry sometime around 300 B.C. Centuries passed 
before anyone realized that other geometric systems 
were even mathematically possible. Today we have a 
well-accepted scientific theory (Einstein's General 
Theory of Relativity) which actually claims that space 
is curved (that a Non-Euclidean geometry applies). 
But the choice of a geometry is not purely arbi-
trary. Well over a hundred years ago Gauss devised an 
experiment to trace a triangle between three mountain 
peaks so as to determine whether or not the interior 
angles summed to a number different from 180. Since 
then there have been a number of other attempts to 
determine empirically the topology of physical space 
(i.e. to decide which geometry applies). 
*An earlier version of this paper was presented 
at the American Graduate Student Conference on Philos 
ophy, October 22, 1976, The American University, 
Washington, D. C. 
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Hans Reichenbach recognized that a number of causal 
principles are presupposed in these experiments an3 
suggested that, for geometry to be an empirical matter, 
we have to introduce the requirement that no causal re-
lations are violated (that there are no causal anomalies). 
Only in this way, says Reichenbach, does the question 
about the topology of space even constitute a well-
determined question.1 
Though objectionable in certain respects, I think 
Reichenbach's thesis represents a significant insight 
into the interdependence of geometry and causation. In 
this paper therefore, I will undertake to defend the 
general drift of that thesis: there are indeed close 
connections between geometry and causation. The geometry 
we ascribe to physical space will help determine the 
nature of our causal laws, and vice-versa. But perhaps 
I am getting ahead of myself; for reasons which will 
become apparent later, before I can appropriately deal 
with this thesis I must first discuss Reichenbach 's 
notion of a universal force. 
2. Universal Forces. Universal forces, in contradis-
tinction to differential forces, are ones (i) which 
affect all substances in exactly the same way and (ii) 
against which no insulating walls can be built (cf. 
Reichenbach, p. 13). Reichenbach further distinguishes 
between universal forces "preserving coincidences" and 
those "destroying coincidences." The forces preserving 
coincidences are constant throughout the entire universe 
and consequently neither the force nor its effects can 
be objectively determined. The ones destroying coinci-
dences are active only in localized regions of space 
and therefore are demonstrable. Adolf Grunbaum (Phil-
osophical Problems of Space and Time, 2nd ed. (Boston: 
Reidel, 1973)] has subsequently characterized those 
universal forces which preserve coincidences as "meta-
phorical" and those which destroy coincidences as 
"literal." It is these "literal" universal forces 
which will prove most important for our present con-
cerns . 
Reichenbach explains that, actually, "The distinc-
tion between universal and differential forces merely 
classifies the phenomenon as belonging in geometry or 
in physics" (Reichenbach, p. 27). A force is something 
which is responsible for a geometrical change; conse-
quently the existence of a force is dependent upon the 
coordinate definition of geometry. 
If our measurements indicated that a geometry G' 
obtained, we could still choose to call G the "actual" 
geometry and posit a universal force F to explain the 
discrepancy in our measurements. Thus Reichenbach can 
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assert, "We obtain a statement about physical reality 
only if in addition to the geometry G of space its 
universal field of force F is specified. Only the 
combination 
G + F 
is testable statement" (Reichenbach, p. 33). Simply 
being told that a geometry G applies will not convey 
any information about physical space unless we also 
know what, if any, universal forces are being employed.* 
3. Causal Anomalies. Suppose we have specified the 
geometry and the universal field of force (i.e. we have 
a statement of the form G + F) j have we now adequately 
described the topology of physical space? Reichenbach 
says no; there still may be causal anomalies which we 
have not yet considered. 
To illustrate, Reichenbach asks us to imagine a 
system of concentric spherical shells (figure 1) and 
the experiences of a man climbing about on them (cf. 
Reichenbach, pp. 63-66). After measuring shell. 1, the 
man proceeds to shell 2. Measuring 2, he finds it to 
be smaller than 1 and thus concludes that it is situated 
inside 1. He is astonished however to find 3 as large 
as 1 and hence larger than 2. In Euclidean geometry, 3 
has to be smaller than 2 since it is enclosed by 2. Our 
explorer chooses to adhere to Euclidean geometry and 
explains his measurements by a contraction of the 
measuring rod; his rod and also his body contract so 
that 3 appears larger than 2. In Reichenbach (s termi-
nology, the explorer posits a "universal force" to 
explain the difference between the "actual" and the 
"apparent" geometry.3 Going on to shell 4 he measures 
it to be even larger than 3; his rod has further con-
tracted. 5 he again finds as large as 3 and 1. 
But here his observations startle him. Everything 
in 5 is familiar to him, including his own house which 
had been built on shell 11 The correspondence is per-
fect in every detail; the house is exactly as he had 
left it. Yet he is quite certain that he is separated 
from surface 1 by the intervening shells. If he is to 
retain Euclidean geometry he must conclude that there 
are two identical worlds; every event on surface 1 is 
paralleled by an identical event on 5. . 
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(figure 1 ) : Concentric Spherical Shells 
(to be conceived 3-dimensionally; the circles being 
cross sections of spherical shells in the plane of 
the drawing) 
Figure 1 was drawn to represent the shells on a 
Euclidean interpretation. An alternative interpreta-
tion of these bizarre experiences would be to adopt the 
geometry öf the torus (figure 2 ) . On this interpreta-
tion our explorer starts at the shell whose cross sec-
tion is appropriately labeled "1," He travels "inward" 
toward the "hole" where the cross section of the second 
shell is labeled "2," continues traveling around the 
torus (his path of travel being represented by the dotted 
line) till he is on the "underneath" side at shell 3; 
naturally 3 measures larger than 2 and equal to 1. Shell 
4 is the "outer rim" of the torus and 5 is of course 
identical with 1, our explorer having come full circle. 
(figure 2 ) : A Torus 
Reichenbach has presented us with a hypothetical 
situation in which even positing a universal force 
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(responsible for the contractions of the measuring rod) 
would not suffice to allow us to retain Euclidean 
geometry. In addition, a causal anomaly occurs; there 
is a spatial periodicity of all events (a kind of pre-
established harmony). Thus if our description in 
Euclidean geometry is to be topologically equivalent 
to the description in the Mon-Euclidean geometry of 
the torus, we must, in Reichenbach's notation, write 
G 0 + F + A and not just GQ + F (where Go is Euclidean 
geometry, F is the universal field of force, and A is 
the causal anomaly). 
The causal anomaly manifests itself because the 
torus and the plane have different holistic properties 
(they are topologically different surfaces). While any 
two surfaces can be mapped one upon the other (as by 
the projection of shadows by light rays), it is only for 
surfaces with the same holistic properties that it is 
possible to carry through this transformation uniquely 
and continuously in all points. Here I use "uniquely" 
with Reichenbach to mean: "one and only one point of 
one surface corresponds to a given point of the other 
surface, and vice-versa"; i.e. there is a one-to-one 
function from the points of one surface onto the points 
of the other. "Continuously means: neighborhood re-
lations in infinitesimal domains are preserved; no 
tearing of the surface or shifting of relative positions 
of points occur at any place" (Reichenbach, p. 59) . 
Small regions of topologically different surfaces can 
be mapped thusly, but no such transformation is possible 
for the whole surface. It is this violation of conti-
nuity and/or uniqueness which corresponds in the physical 
interpretation to a causal anomaly. 
4• The Disappearance of Universal Forces and the 
Elimination of Causal Anomalies. On the one hand 
Reichenbach Believes that "the question concerning the 
structure of space" will not be meaningful unless 
universa.l forces are set equal to zero; "only then," 
he says, "is the problem of geometry uniquely deter-
mined" (Reichenbach, p. 27; cf. also Carnap's remarks 
in his "Introductory Remarks to the English Edition" of 
The Philosophy of Space and Time, p. vii). On the other 
hand, ReichenbacK says that, "the topological character 
of space . . . is determined only if we add the postulate 
of the disappearance of causal anomalies" (Reichenbach, 
p. 279; cf. also p. 80). Propounding both theses at 
once he says, 
The metric of a space becomes an empirical fact 
only after the postulate of the disappearance of 
universal forces is introduced. Similarly, the 
topology of space becomes an empirical fact only 
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if we add the postulate of the principle of 
action by contact (Reichenbach, p. 279). 
Reichenbach would have us set both the universal field 
of force F and the causal anomaly A equal to zero. 
Unfortunately this is not always possible—consider 
another hypothetical situation analogous to Reichenbach"s 
own: 
This time our explorer measures shell 2 to be 
smaller than 1, 3 smaller than 2, 4 smaller still, and 
5 even smaller. Upon arriving in shell 5 however, his 
experiences are even more bizarre than before. Not 
only is there a duplication of everything that he left 
in shell 1 but, since shell 5 is smaller, everything 
else is correspondingly smaller; he is a giant in a 
world identical to the one he just left. Upon return-
ing to shell 1, his fiends tell him of a similar giant 
who visited in his absence and finally left looking 
quite dumbfounded. Wandering off in the other direction 
the shells get increasingly larger till, in the fifth 
shell, he is a dwarf in a world exactly like the other 
two. 
If he is to retain Euclidean geometry our explorer 
must assume that there is a series of identical worlds 
which get progressively smaller as you proceed in one 
direction and progressively larger in the other. No 
universal forces have been posited, yet a severe causal 
anomaly occurs. In other words, we have normalized 
F - 0 but cannot, as Reichenbach would have us do, 
accept "normal" causality. 
If we set A equal to zero however, we will require 
F 0. If we choose to accept toroid geometry and the 
identity of these worlds, we will have to assume the 
presence of universal forces which increase the size 
of our explorer and his measuring rod when he goes from 
shell 2 to 3 and from 3 to 4, but decrease his size 
when he goes from 4 to 3 and from 3 to 2. Thus 
G 0 + A = G + F 
In this hypothetical situation we can, by the choice 
of geometry, set either F or A equal to zero, but not 
both. Thus the example squeezes Reichenbach between his 
attempt to set F equal to zero and his attempt to have A 
equal to zero. He cannot object that such a state of 
the universe cannot exist; for we have started from the 
perceptions of an observer and, in Reichenbach's own 
words, "No a priori postulate can exclude the possibility 
that some person may at some time have certain percep-
tions. Only the interpretation of such perceptions is 
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controversial" (Reichenbach, p. 77) . If nothing else, 
this casts serious doubt on the universal acceptability 
of Reichenbach's twin "methodological" postulates of the 
disappearance of universal forces and the elimination of 
causal anomalies. If Reichenbach wants to maintain that 
we must set F equal to zero, he cannot also require us 
to set A equal to zero. If he chooses instead to go 
with A having always to equal zero, he cannot require 
us to set F = 0. None of this of course precludes him 
from insisting either that F must always equal zero or 
that A must always equal zero; it does however preclucfe 
him from doing both, and in so doing, casts doubt on 
the ultimacy of either.4 
"Causal anomaly" is a relative term; an anomaly 
under one set of causal laws may be a perfectly normal 
causal relation under a different set. For this reason 
it may be more felicitous to break with Reichenbach and 
speak merely of differing sets of causal laws. The 
system we have been calling "normal" causality (with 
Reichenbach) is just another system of causality; there 
is no reason to believe that it should be uniquely pick-
ed out by stipulating that F = 0. Thus instead of 
Reichenbach's claim that we have to accept "normal" 
causality for topology to be an empirical matter, we 
can say that the system of causality needs only to be 
specified; different topologies require different sets 
of causal laws. 
5. Connections between Geometry and Causation. In 
Reichenbach's hypothetical example, as in my own, if 
the explorer decides to retain the principle of action 
by contact and refuses to admit any kind of pre-
established harmony, then given his experiences he can-
not consistently ascribe Euclidean geometry to physical 
space. Conversely, if he chooses to retain Euclidean 
geometry at all costs, his experiences will preclude 
him from adopting the traditional system of causal laws. 
Either alternative would be open to him and his choice 
could be fairly arbitrary, but he could not, so to 
speak, "have his cake and eat it too": he could not 
choose to retain both Euclidean geometry and "normal" 
causality. 5 
None of this shows that the principle of action by 
contact is, in fact, incompatible with Euclidean geom-
etry; the question is ah empirical one. A given geometry 
does not logically entail a specific set of causal laws, 
or vice-versa. It is only in conjunction with empirical 
experience that beliefs about causality have ramifica-
tions for the geometry of physical space. Similarly, 
unless concatinated with experience, geometry does not 
tell us anything about causation. But given experiences 
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such as we have described, adhering to a set of causal 
laws will limit our freedom when assigning a geometry 
to physical space, and adhering to a geometry will cur-
tail our freedom in formulating "laws" of causality. 
Just how thorough-going are these connections be-
tween geometry and causation? Does a set of causal 
laws pick out a unique geometry for physical space? 
vice-versa? There is of course a rather trivial sense 
in which we can answer these questions in the negative: 
obviously our experiences can be scant or irrelevant 
and there is surely a half-way house where our experi-
ences would suffice to establish some relationships 
between geometry and causation, but would simply be 
insufficient for a unique prescription. We are thereby 
enticed to move on to the more penetrating question as 
to whether a system of causal laws, in conjunction with 
unlimited experience, will pick out a unique geometry 
for physical space, or vice-versa. 
This question is not so easy to answer, but we can 
begin by recalling that differing sets of causal laws 
are required whenever we shift between geometries with 
different holistic properties. Any two geometries with 
the same holistic properties can be rendered equivalent 
by the addition of universal forces. Does this mean 
that topologically equivalent geometries will never 
require different causal laws? Not necessarily; univer-
sal forces may themselves sometimes constitute a type 
of causal anomaly. We must investigate the causal 
status of universal forces. To this end it will be 
instructive to consider gravitation, although it is not 
purely a universal force.6 
Bertrand Russell, for one, rejoiced in Einstein's 
treatment of gravitation. With the adoption of non-
Euclidean geometry, he observed, we no longer need to 
assume that the sun somehow "makes" the earth travel in 
an ellipse about it; the earth simply travels along the 
natural geodesic prescribed by the geometry; no "forces" 
or "little pushes" are required to keep it on its orbit.7 
It is not that we have excused ourselves from giving a 
causal explanation of the orbit—we are using geometrical 
considerations as our physical explanation, not rejecting 
the need for one. The geometry of the universe serves 
as our "cause." 
In such a case, the change of geometry and the re-
sultant postulation of universal forces entails a cor-
responding change in the causal explanation of certain 
phenomena. It may well be that a change in geometry 
always entails a change in the explanation of some such 
phenomenon. Still, the point of the causal anomaly was 
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that it represented a change in causal laws; changing our 
causal explanations of certain phenomeni-IF not the same 
thing as changing our system of causal laws. We seek to 
know whether changing from one geometry~to~another with 
the same holistic properties involves a change in causal 
Part of our difficulties here stem from our ignor-
ance about what actually constitutes a change in causal 
laws. I suggest that this much is certain: a change 
in causal laws is involved whenever the explanation 
under one of the geometries requires a principle not 
used to explain any phenomena whatsoever under the other 
geometry. Thus if one geometry could support explana-
tions of all phenomena without invoking action at a 
distance, but the other geometry could not (as in 
Reichenbach's hypothetical example), we would say that 
a change in causal laws was required. 
A further source of difficulty may seem to lie in 
our agreement to allow unlimited experience; how are we 
to know what unlimited experience would turn up? For-
tunately, we are not tied to the experiences of the 
"real" world; we have recourse to hypothetical situa-
tions. Thus we can assume that gravitation is a univer-
sal force, pure and simple, and not be bothered about 
its differential effects (there simply won't be any in 
our.hypothetical worlds). 
If we assume that, given enough time, physics will 
discover some gravitons or demonstrate the existence of 
the aether, we may conclude that the change in geometry 
analogous to that proposed by Einstein will not neces-
sitate a change in causal laws; no differentiating 
principle of causation would be needed. If on the other 
hand, we assume that even unlimited experience will not 
turn up such substances, the change in geometry would 
entail a change in causal laws. Adhering to Euclidean 
geometry would preclude us from adopting a system of 
causation which did not sanction action at a distance; 
the alternative geometry, however, would not require 
the use of this principle. 
So we have one case in which a change between 
geometries with the same holistic properites requires 
a change in the system of causal explanation and one 
case in which it does not. We have already seen that 
changing between geometries with different holistic 
properties requires a change in the causal laws. The 
interesting point about discovering gravitons or aether 
is that Euclidean geometry would not have to use action-
at-a-distance to explain gravitational forces and hence 
could employ the same set of causal laws as does the 
Non-Euclidean geometry of Einstein. A change in geometry 
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does not always necessitate a change in the system of 
causal laws. 
Now we have left only to investigate whether a 
change in causal laws will always entail a change in 
geometry? given the same unlimited experiences, is more 
than one system of causal laws compatible with any one 
geometry? It is important to notice the qualification 
"given the same unlimited experiences"; in our contact 
under one set of experiences and compatible with action 
at a distance under another set. But we did not there-
by show that, given only one set of experiences, we can 
make a change in our system of causal laws without 
having to change our geometry also. 
As one might expect, the real difficulty arises in 
trying to find two differing systems of causal laws 
which cannot be decided between on the basis of exper-
ience. To this end, the philosophy of Bishop Berkeley 
will prove to be a blessing. For Berkeley, to exist is 
to be perceived (esse est percipi). Leaving aside 
Berkeley's divine perceiver, objects continually pop in 
and out of existence; I can make this peiece of paper 
cease to exist and then recreate it again simply by 
turning my head for a few seconds. Obviously there 
must be some sort of causal connection between the ob-
server and the object observed. In fact Berkeley's 
system was intended as an alternative to that system 
which explains the existence of physical objects by 
some kind of underlying substratum or substance (John 
Locke's system in particular). Naturally, Berkeley's 
system is at variance with present day physics; it 
represents a different set of causal laws. 
Berkeley's system was never well-accepted; even at 
the outset it was thought to be disproved simply by 
kicking a stone. But the system is not so easily dis-
proved; to show that it is mistaken one would have to 
demonstrate the existence of a physical object at a 
time when it was not perceived by anyone.8 His system 
has the distinctive feature that it cannot be rejected 
simply by using sensory experience; if we are to reject 
the system, it roust be on some other grounds. 
But the geometry of physical space will not provide 
such a basis; there is nothing about causing objects to 
exist by perceiving them which requires us to give up 
Euclidean, or any other geometry for that matter (if 
there were, you can be assured that someone would have 
advanced- it as an argument against Berkeley). The con-
clusion is obvious: even given the same set of unlimited 
experiences there is nothing about changing to the causal 
laws dictated by Berkeley's system which would require us 
to change the geometry we assign to physical space; a 
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change in causal laws will not always entail a change in 
geometry. 
6. Summary. In addition to showing that Reichenbach is 
mistaken in wanting to set both F and A equal to zero, 
we have established (i) that a change in geometry can 
compel a corresponding change in our system of causal 
laws,9 (ii) that a change in geometry can take place 
without entailing a change in the system of causal" laws,-"-0 
(iii) that a change in causal laws can require a change 
in the geometry we assign to physical space,11 and (iv) 
that a change in causal laws can be made without re-
quiring a change in geometry.12 Conjoining these four 
theses we may say that, though there are times when a 
change in causal laws will entail a change in geometry 
(and vice-versa), even in conjunction with unlimited 
experience, a system of causal laws will not necessarily 
suffice to pick out a unique geometry (or vice-versa). 
The connections between geometry and causation are 
close indeed, but not close enough for a unique pre-
scription. 
University of Illinois at Chicago Circle 
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NOTES 
1 C f . Hans Reichenbach, The Philosophy of Space and 
Time, Eng. ed. (New York; Dover, 1958), pp. 80, 279. 
2 
It may be helpful to note that the "actual" geom-
etry 6', for which F has been set equal to zero, is 
just that geometry which results when we assume our 
measuring rods to be rigid. 
3 
The force is universal rather than differential 
since it affects all substances in exactly the same way 
and cannot be shielded against; it is a literal force 
which is said to destroy coincidences since it is opera-
tive on shell 3, but not on shells 1 and 2. 
^Incidently, we might still go along with him about 
setting both equal to zero if possible and use some 
other criteria (e.g. overall simplicity of the system) 
to decide which, if either, to set equal to zero if a 
situation such as we have described should ever arise. 
"'The alternative of disbelieving the sensory ex-
periences is ruled out because the experiences are quite 
reproducible and the measurements and observations can 
be repeated as often as one should care to go through 
the procedure. 
^Gravitation is universal in that it cannot be 
shielded against and, in some respects, affects all 
substances in the exact same way (e.g. the rate of 
acceleration of a falling body does not vary with the 
chemical composition of that body). But the force is 
differential in certain of its other effects (e.g. a 
wooden bookshelf will sag more under the influence of 
gravity than a steel one) (cf. Grunbaüm pp. 91-92) . 
7 
Bertrand Russell, An Outline of Philosophy (1927; 
rpt. New York: World, 1963), pp. 122-23. 
ft 
Things become further complicated if we introduce 
the divine perceiver since even this demonstration would 
fail to disprove the theory; I have left him out for two 
reasons: (1) unlimited experience should perhaps turn 
up the existence of such a god, and (2) leaving him out 
simply makes for a sharper distinction in the systems of 
causal laws. 
16 8 
^This is established for geometries with different 
holistic properties by Reichenbach's hypothetical example 
and, for geometries with the same holistic properties, 
by my reflections on gravitation. 
•*"°This is shown by my reflections on gravitation for 
a change from G to G' where G and G' do not have dif-
ferent holistic properties. 
"^This is established by Reichenbach's hypothetical 
example. Given the experiences of our explorer, if his 
causal laws preclude pre-established harmony of any sort, 
he cannot consistently ascribe Euclidean geometry to 
physical space; which is not to say that his causal 
laws have uniquely picked out the replacement geometry, 
though they have presumably ruled out all geometries 
topologically similar to the Euclidean planar geometry. 
12 
This is what we just showed using Berkeley's 
alternative system. 
